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Abstract 
Turkey entered the final stage of its association with the European Union with the 
entry into force of the customs union on 1.1.1996. A customs union is an advanced form of 
economic integration which brings commercial and economic costs and benefits to both 
parties. In this connection Turkish industry entered a period of restructuring and increased 
its share in European markets. As of today, there are a number of problems stemming from 
the implementation of the customs union. The final target is Turkey’s membership to the EU 
as a result of the accession negotiations continuing since 2005. However, until that day, the 
current  problems  have  to  be  resolved  within  the  Association  Council  by  way  of  joint 
decision –making mechanisms. 
Keywords: Customs Union, Turkey-EU Relations, Free Movement 
 
TÜRKİYE-AB GÜMRÜK BİRLİĞİ: SORUNLAR VE BEKLENTİLER 
 
Özet 
Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği ile ortaklık ilişkisinin son aşaması 1.1.1996 tarihinde 
gümrük birliğinin yürürlüğe girmesi ile gerçekleşmiştir. Gümrük birliği, taraflara ticari ve 
ekonomik  faydalar  ve  maliyetler  getiren  ileri  bir  ekonomik  bütünleşme  modelidir.  Bu 
bağlamda Türk sanayisi önemli bir yeniden yapılanma sürecine girmiş ve Türkiye’nin AB 
ülkelerinde  Pazar  payı  artış  göstermiştir.  Bugün  itibariyle,  gümrük  birliğinin 
uygulanmasından  kaynaklanan  çeşitli  sorunlar  bulunmaktadır.  Nihai  hedef  Türkiye’nin 
2005 yılından bu yana yürüttüğü AB üyelik müzakereleri süreci sonucunda tam üyeliğinin 
gerçekleşmesidir. Ancak o güne dek, var olan sorunlar Ortaklık Konseyi içinde, ortak karar 
mekanizmaları yoluyla çözüme kavuşturulmalıdır. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Gümrük Birliği, Türkiye-AB İlişkileri, Serbest Dolaşım 
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INTRODUCTION 
Today, Turkey is one of few countries that have a customs union with the 
EU without being a member. The other states one may cite are San Marino and 
Andorra, miniscule states that cannot be compared to Turkey. Turkey is at the same 
time a country negotiating for membership to the EU. Until now, twelve chapters 
have  been  opened  to  negotiations,  the  latest  being  food  safety,  veterinary  and 
phytosanitary  policy,  and  only  one  chapter  has  been  provisionally  closed.  The 
negotiations are proceeding at a slow pace due to some problems related with the 
European Council’s decision not to open eight chapters of the acquis, and blocking 
of additional chapters by some Member States. Compared with Croatia that started 
negotiations with the EU at the same time, negotiations with Turkey have been 
progressing  at  a  slow  pace  since  2006,  with  Croatia  provisionally  closing  22 
chapters and aiming to sign the accession treaty in 2011. The future of the process 
is fraught with uncertainties since, governments of especially two leading Member 
States, France and Germany, adopted a position against Turkey’s full membership
2. 
The Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus (GASC) became a member 
state as of 1 May 2004 after rejecting a UN plan for reunification of the island. 
This act is against EU law and it has been a grave mistake for the EU to accept a 
Member State where a UN peacekeeping force is situated in. The GASC then used 
its  membership  to  block  progress  in  the  negotiations  with  Turkey,  blocking  a 
regulation for direct trade with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the 
opening of a critical chapter in the negotiations, the energy chapter, in addition to 
others. It was again a grave mistake in the part of the EU to take the decision not to 
open  eight chapters of the acquis to  negotiations  with Turkey, with the alleged 
reason that Turkey is not fully implementing the customs union to the new Member 
States  by  not  accepting  vehicles  coming  from  the  GASC  to  Turkish  ports  and 
airports. While this issue is taken unilaterally and evaluated as related with the 
operation  of  the  Turkey-EU  customs  union,  without  taking  into  account  the 
isolation of the Turkish Cypriots on the island after the EU membership of the 
GASC,  the  implementation  of  transportation  quotas  by  EU  member  states  to 
Turkish  trucks  is  evaluated  as  falling  under  services  and  not  related  with  the 
operation of the customs union. 
The customs union which commenced as of 1.1.1996 displays a number of 
structural  problems.  In  the  following  section,  some  of  these  problems  will  be 
explained. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 It should be noted that the German government under the premiership of Angela Merkel 
declared that they  would  uphold  the decision  of  opening negotiations  with Turkey  and 
would act in accordance with the principle of “pacta sund servanda”. However, personally 
Ms Merkel is for a privileged membership.  Turkey-EU Customs Union …                               DEÜ SBE Dergisi, Cilt:12, Sayı:2 
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JOINT DECISION-MAKING 
At the time the customs union  decision  was adopted by the EC-Turkey 
Association  Council,  it  was  expected  that  full  membership  will  follow  in  a 
considerably short period of time ranging from four to eight years. After all the 
EEC was based on a customs union
3 and once Turkey demonstrates that she can 
undertake  obligations  arising  from  membership,  accession  negotiations  would 
commence as provided in the Article 28 of the Association Agreement.  Therefore 
the decision making was not considered a major problem. Once Turkey becomes a 
member  of  the  EU,  it  would  take  part  in  the  decision  making  and  have  its 
representatives  in  the  institutions  of  the  Union.  Thus  Turkey  would  have  the 
opportunity to influence and impact on the making of economic and trade policies 
in the EU. However, it has been fifteen  years since the  entry  into force  of the 
customs union decision and still we do not have a clear prospect for membership. 
This  situation  complicates  the  operation  of  the  customs  union  due  to  lack  of 
effective joint decision-making mechanisms. 
Turkey adopted all the instruments, agreements, protocols concerning the 
Common Commercial Policy and a substantial part of the acquis communautaire in 
1996.  The  external  commercial  policies  of  both  Turkey  and  EC  were  almost 
identical  since  the  customs  union  necessitated  Turkey’s  harmonization  of  its 
legislation with that of the EU in the area of commercial policy. 
The  Turkey-EU  customs  union  is  part  of  a  global  trade  regime  and  is 
permitted  by  the  World  Trade  Organization  under  Article  24  of  the  General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Both the EU and Turkey have been supporters of 
multilateral trade negotiations within the GATT/WTO system. With the collapse or 
failure of the current round of multilateral trade negotiations, the Doha round, the 
EU increasingly turned to bilateral trade negotiations and agreements as a way to 
compensate for the lack of progress in the multilateral arena. EC started to have 
many bilateral agreements as multilateral possibilities were not realized. 
Whilst the European Commission starts and negotiates such agreements on 
behalf of the Council, it does so concerning the “European Customs Area". An 
important point to note is that the “European Customs Area” is not composed of 
only the Member States, but it actually  means 27  Member States plus Turkey. 
Countries  such  as  San  Marino  and  Andorra  may  also  have  customs  union 
arrangements  with  the  EU,  but  the  impact  of  these  customs  unions  may  be 
neglected since the mentioned countries are mini-states with a population of about 
31,000 and 84,000 respectively. Turkey, having a population  of 72  million and 
being the 16th largest economy in the world as well as the sixth largest economy in 
Europe is a major trade partner of the EU. It is unfair and inappropriate to accept 
Turkey’s external trade relations to be decided in Brussels by 27 Member States 
excluding Turkey. 
                                                 
3 Former Article 9 of the EEC Treaty Kabaalioğlu, H.                                                     DEÜ SBE Dergisi, Cilt:12, Sayı:2 
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The  lack  of any  effective procedures for Turkey’s involvement  in EU’s 
trade  negotiations  including  Committee  133  where  the  Union’s  common 
negotiation position is determined, leads to the negotiation and conclusion of such 
Free  Trade  and  other  Agreements  without  any  meaningful discussion  or 
consultation with Turkey. 
Europe  goes  ahead  and  negotiates  and  concludes  all  these  agreements 
asking Turkey and the partner country to enter into a similar agreement. However, 
there  is  no  obligation  on  the  part  of  the  third  country  to  conclude  such  an 
agreement  with  Turkey  and  in  the  absence  of  any  compelling  economic  or 
commercial considerations they refuse to do so. Such a process is not the way to 
operate a customs union. EU is not complying with the implicit requirements of the 
custom  union  with  Turkey  which  includes  the  necessity  to  reach  a common 
position before starting negotiations.  
An  accession  country  which  has  a  full  customs  union,  in  all  industrial 
products  and  some  of  the  agricultural  (processed)  products, deserves  a  better 
treatment.  A  possible  remedy  may  be  Turkey’s  sitting  as  observer  in  relevant 
Council  meetings  which  directly  concerns  Turkey. 
If this cannot be achieved and both sides are to go ahead on their own, still, a 
common position must be established and both negotiations must be held parallel to 
each other, to be concluded together and, to the extent possible, to enter into force 
together.  
Commission officials recently came up with a solution to this problem: the 
Turkey clause. They will include a clause in a prospective FTA asking that third 
State to conclude a similar agreement with Turkey. Obviously this is not binding 
and has no binding effect on that country. Thus the Turkey clause will not have any 
practical effect and will not provide a solution to the problem.  
 
EQUAL COMPETITIVE CONDITIONS 
Turkey  experienced a further disadvantage in the custom union since  it 
cannot  make  use  of  funds  which  are  targeted  to  aid  ailing  industries  or  less-
developed or declining regions. As a country which is not yet a member of the EU, 
it cannot be a party to EU structural funds which are made available to EU firms 
and regions. 
Before  entry  into  force  of  the  customs  union,  Turkey  adopted  all  the 
competition  rules  of  the  EU  and  established  a  Competition  Authority  which  is 
considered as much more efficient  than most of the Member State competition 
authorities
4.  
The promise made by 15 Member States -when the CU decision 1/95 was 
concluded-  in  a  declaration  for  "substantial  medium  and  long  term  financial 
                                                 
4 Rules on competition and state aids are being applied strictly by Turkish authorities in line 
with the requirement of the customs union to have free and fair competition.  Turkey-EU Customs Union …                               DEÜ SBE Dergisi, Cilt:12, Sayı:2 
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assistance" to Turkey in order to make the customs union a success -considering 
that Turkey will face competition with the most advanced industrialized countries 
of the EU- was never realized due to the veto of one Member State (Balkır et al., 
2009: 8). Since Turkey's candidacy was recognized and accession talks started the 
financial assistance granted to Turkey -compared to previous candidate states like 
Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic etc- is a minimal amount (Balkır et al., 2009: 
8)
5.  
Whilst Turkey undertakes almost all obligations arising from membership 
in a customs union, it has not received adequate support form the EU with regard to 
problems of competitiveness and adjustment costs resulting from the opening up of 
the Turkish  economy.  A  company  called  YEDAŞ  operating  in the ball bearing 
manufacturing sector, applied to the European Court of Justice, with the intention 
of  appealing  for  damages  from  the  EU  for  losses  incurred  due  to  the  customs 
union
6. While Turkey assumed the cost of adjustment to the customs union, this 
was in line with a reasonable expectation of membership. Customs union was not 
seen as an end in itself but a step further towards full membership of the EU. The 
hope of full membership that we had in 2004 when the EU took the decision to 
open  accession  negotiations  in  October  3,  2005  receded  due  to  complications, 
blockages  and  negative  messages  on  the  part  of  the  EU.  Customs  unions  are 
transitional arrangements that pave the way for further integration as observed in 
the case of the German Zollverein established in 1818 and led to the unification of 
the German principalities under Prussian leadership in 1871.   
 
FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS 
EU  economic  actors-  businessmen,  industrialist,  service  providers, 
researchers, market analysts- and all EU citizens travel  with  no restrictions and 
enter into Turkey either with no visa or with a visa to be obtained at the border post 
before making entry. The situation is completely reversed for Turkish citizens. All 
Member States imposed an entry visa requirement for citizens of Turkey under the 
insistence of the German Government which itself introduced the visa requirement 
entering  into  force  5  September  1980,  under  the  pretext  of  preventing  political 
asylums. It is a well-known fact that under the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees, States are under an obligation to consider requests for 
political asylum even if the applicant cannot show any document, even a passport. 
Thus  visa  requirement  would  not  be  an  effective  device  to  prevent  an  asylum 
application. 
The visa requirement was later imposed by France and Benelux in 1982 
following  Germany.  It  now  covers  27  Member  States.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
Association  Agreement  envisaged  a  timetable  for  the  introduction  of  free 
                                                 
5  For  more  information:  Arzu  Odabaşı,  Türkiye’ye  Yönelik  AB  Fonları  ve  Kullanım 
Koşulları, İKV, İstanbul, 2004. 
6 Please see notices posted by the company on the web site www.yedas.com.tr, Accessed on 
11.08.2010.   Kabaalioğlu, H.                                                     DEÜ SBE Dergisi, Cilt:12, Sayı:2 
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movement of workers between the EEC and Turkey until 1986. It was a clearly 
defined target date with a clear reference to EEC Treaty and its relevant provisions 
concerning  free  movement  of  workers  between  Member  states  to  be  applied 
between EEC and Turkey
7. 
Customs Union -free movement of goods- was to be achieved between the 
twelfth and twenty-second year after entry into force of the Additional Protocol, 
which meant end of 1995 as the Protocol entered into force in 1973. Likewise, free 
movement of workers was to be achieved between the twelfth and twenty-second 
year after  entry  into force  of the  Association  Agreement  of 1963 in December 
1964. 
Article 36 of the Additional Protocol stated that “Freedom of movement 
for  workers  between  Member  States  of  the  Community  and  Turkey  shall  be 
secured by progressive stages in accordance with the principles set out in Article 
12 of the Agreement of Association between the end of the twelfth and the twenty-
second  year  after  the  entry  into  force  of  that  Agreement.”  The  article  of  the 
Association agreement referred to stipulated that the related articles of the Rome 
Treaty would be taken as a model guiding the relations between the parties in this 
area:  “The Contracting Parties agree to be guided by Articles 48, 49 and 50 of the 
Treaty  establishing  the  Community  for  the  purpose  of  progressively  securing 
freedom of movement for workers between them.” 
Thus when the  Additional Protocol  determined the time-tables for these 
free movements in 1970, it was absolutely clear that Turkey considered that she 
will be opening up her borders to EU industrial products in 1996, that is a full ten 
years after entry into force of the free movement of workers. 
European Court of Justice, whilst pointing out that this does not have direct 
effect-as it requires a decision of the Council of Association- underlines that this is 
a clear obligation under International Law. At the present time, since 1996 there is 
a full  customs union as provided in the  Association Agreement and  Additional 
Protocol, the EEC obligation for establishing free movement of workers between 
Turkey and EEC  as of 1986 is still not implemented.  There may be social reasons, 
rising  unemployment  rates,  economic  crises  at  the  time  that  hindered  the 
fulfillment of this target. However, this is still a fundamental column of the EC-
Turkey Association Agreement which has not been achieved. 
To make the situation worse, a new restriction was imposed as of 1980, the 
entry visa requirement, whilst the free movement of workers was not implemented.   
This  is  a  condition  which  also  negatively  affects  the  operation  of  the  Customs 
Union.  Turkish  citizens,  especially  economic  actors  that  are  actually  primarily 
involved  with  the  operation  of  the  customs  union  such  as  businessmen, 
                                                 
7 Additional Protocol Annexed to the Agreement establishing an association between the 
EEC  and  Turkey,  Article  36.  Official  Journal  of  the  EC,  L  361,  31.12.1977,  p.1-120. 
http://www.avrupa.info.tr/Files/File/EU&TURKEY/e-add_ENG.rtf (02.02.2010) Turkey-EU Customs Union …                               DEÜ SBE Dergisi, Cilt:12, Sayı:2 
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industrialists, commercial agents, service providers, and Turkish citizens in general 
must obtain an entry visa from MS Consular Offices.  
The visa application procedure is a cumbersome process which necessitates 
the provision of various legal and official documents by the applicant including the 
following: bank accounts, credit card information, land registry information and 
documents, circular of the firm, and other personal and commercial documents and 
information. In addition, an invitation letter from the corresponding firm in the EU 
is also required which damages the condition of equality in commercial relations. 
How  can  you  have  an  arm's  length  negotiation  with  a  company  if  even  your 
presence in that country depends on a letter of invitation to be supplied by your 
counterpart? An Erasmus student going to Netherlands must pay 460 euro for a 
visa covering the Erasmus semester. The visa procedure, and considerable fees 
levied for long-term stays in EU Member states harms the true intention and aim of 
this program which is supposed to contribute to social and educational integration 
among European youth
8. 
Turkish  businessmen,  exporters  who  will  go  to  a  Fair  (Frankfurt  or 
Hannover  Messe)  after  complying  with  all  these  outrageous  demands  for 
documentation and paying substantial visa fees, still have to wait days, sometimes 
weeks, thereby missing the dates of the fairs, appointments, bids, etc.. Goods are in 
free  circulation  but  persons  who  will  sell  these  goods  are  barred,  restricted  or 
delayed with horrendous bureaucracy and costs involved. 
Judgments of the European Court of Justice including Savas, Tüm & Dari, 
and  the  latest  Soysal made  it  absolutely  clear  that  Article  41  of  the  Additional 
Protocol which provided a standstill clause on free movement of services and right 
of established has a direct effect. The article states that “the Contracting Parties 
shall  refrain  from  introducing  between  themselves  any  new  restrictions  on  the 
freedom  of  establishment  and  the  freedom  to  provide  services”.  An  entry  visa 
requirement constitutes a new restriction which is contrary to the ban of any new 
measures that will restrict the freedom of establishment and freedom to provide 
services  between  the  parties.   Thus  the  situation  applicable  when  the  Protocol 
entered into force will be the yardstick and no back sliding would be allowed. The 
criteria to determine whether Member States’ policies were in line or contrary to 
this provision would be to check whether they applied a visa at the time of entry 
into  force  of  the  Additional  Protocol  (1973)  for  Turkish  citizens  or  for  those 
countries  that  became  members  of  the  EC/EU  after  1973,  whether  they 
implemented a visa for Turkish citizens at the time they became a Member of the 
EC/EU. Under the Council of Europe Convention each Member State was to allow 
entry to citizens of other Member States without a visa requirement for touristic 
trips. Some did require a visa for services or business, but service providers or 
                                                 
8 For an extended explanation of the visa procedure implemented by EU Member states to 
Turkish  citizens,  see  Zeynep  Ozler,  Melih  Ozsoz,  Visa  Hotline  Project:  Final  Report, 
(translation by Leyla Tunç Yeltin), IKV Publications, No:231, İstanbul: March 2010 and 
Narin İdriz Tezcan, Visa Hotline Project Background Paper: Turkish Citizens’ Rights in 
the EU, IKV Publications, No:228, İstanbul, February 2010. Kabaalioğlu, H.                                                     DEÜ SBE Dergisi, Cilt:12, Sayı:2 
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businessmen could travel to a Member State without any restriction to make market 
research or conduct analysis before establishing their own business there. 
After the Soysal judgment by the European Court of Justice The European 
Commission  communicated  with  the  Member  States  to  evaluate  whether  their 
related  legislation  was  in  line  with  the  judgment  and  asked  whether  they 
implemented a visa to Turkish nationals either at the time of entry into force of the 
Additional Protocol  or at the time  of their  entry to  the EU. Only two Member 
States, Germany and Denmark replied.  The Commission argued that since this 
issue was under national jurisdiction, it did not have any enforcement powers over 
the  Member  States.  However,  if  a  Member  State  is  applying  visas  to  Turkish 
nationals who want to visit their countries with the aim of provision of services, 
and if this is a requirement enforced after the entry into force of the Additional 
Protocol or after their entry to the EC/EU, this clearly demonstrated a violation of 
EU law. As is well-known international agreement and treaties constitute one of 
the primary sources of EU law and is above the secondary legislation such as the 
Schengen Regulation including a list of countries whose nationals require a visa to 
go  to  the  EU
9.  Schengen  Regulations  of  the  EU  must  be  in  compliance  with 
primary sources of EU Law, among others Turkish Association  Agreement and 
Protocols
10. 
Is it only service providers but also service users/beneficiaries who would 
be able to travel  without a visa?  Darmstadt Verwaltungsgericht said a Turkish 
citizen can travel without a visa if he or she will benefit from medical service in 
Germany provided he had an insurance coverage (or probably sufficient financial 
resources).Tourism is an important service sector. Tourists should also benefit from 
this as user of the services.   
Thus  such  hurdles  and  unequal  treatment  lead  to  the  conclusion  that 
conditions  for  equal  competition  between  Turkey  and  EU  countries,  between 
Turkish businessmen and EU businessmen, between Turkish industrialists and EU 
industrialists does not exist despite the customs union. It is beyond the confines of 
this paper to elaborate on yet other issues complicating the working of the customs 
union, such as the quotas on Turkish trucks and Turkey’s not sharing the customs 
duties collected at the different ports and customs of the EU by way of the EU 
budget.  
 
 
                                                 
9 See Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 listing the third countries 
whose nationals must be in possession of visas  when crossing the external borders and 
those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, Official Journal, L 81, 21.3.2001, 
p.1-7. 
10  See  report  by  Professors  Kees  Groenendijk  and Elspeth  Guild  covering  12  Member 
States  legislation  applicable  in  1973.  Kees  Groenendijk,  Elspeth  Guild,  Visa  Policy  of 
Member States and the EU Towards Turkish Nationals After Soysal, IKV Publications, 
No:232, Istanbul, March 2010. Turkey-EU Customs Union …                               DEÜ SBE Dergisi, Cilt:12, Sayı:2 
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CONCLUSION 
Turkey  is  a  candidate  country  to  the  EU  which  has  the  longest  lasting 
relations  dating  back  to  the  Association  Agreement  of  1963.  As  stipulated  in 
Article 28 of the Agreement, membership was always a long-term vision of this 
relation, however, its timing and circumstances were not clear. Turkey made its 
application for membership in 1987 which was followed by the entry into force of 
the customs union in 1996 and the proclamation of candidacy to the EU in 1999. 
The dates between 1999 and 2004 were quite busy for the Turkish governments 
that  aimed  to  fulfill  the  political  part  of  the  Copenhagen  criteria  to  start  the 
negotiations.  Two  comprehensive  constitutional  amendments  and  seven 
harmonization  packages  were  passed  through  the  parliament,  including  among 
other  measures,  the  abolition  of  the  death  penalty,  extension  of  the  sphere  of 
constitutionally  granted  human  rights,  adoption  of  a  zero-tolerance  for  torture 
policy, the permission of broadcast in languages traditionally used by citizens in 
their  daily  lives,  and  teaching  of  such  languages  in  private  courses,  the 
reorganization of the composition and function of the National Security Council, 
adoption of a new Civil and Penal code.  
These  efforts  led  to  a  positive  evaluation  and  recommendation  to  open 
negotiations by the European Commission in October 2004 and a decision by the 
European Council to start negotiations as of 3 October 2005. This was a victory 
long sought after by Turkey. The European Council confirmed its consensus on 
Turkey’s  membership  to  the  EU  based  on  a  successful  negotiation  process. 
However  the  negotiation  framework  of  3  October  2005  setting  out  the  main 
parameters  of  the  negotiations  was  not  sp  optimistic.  It  stipulated  that  the 
negotiations  are  a  process  whose  “outcome  cannot  be  guaranteed  beforehand”. 
Even if the negotiations do not culminate in membership, Turkey should remain 
“anchored  to  European  structures.  The  document  also  foresaw  long  transition 
periods and permanent derogations in sensitive areas such as agriculture, structural 
funds and free movement of persons. Thus, it was clear that Turkey’s negotiation 
process would be quite difficult and not comparable to earlier candidate countries.  
The discriminatory and cautious attitude of the EU displayed in the negotiation 
framework was the first blow to the accession process. 
The second blow to the negotiations came with the Council’s decision of 
2006 not to open eight chapters of the acquis to negotiations and not to close any 
chapter provisionally. The reasoning behind this  decision  was  explained above. 
Thus a successful conclusion of negotiations would be dependent on the resolution 
of  the  Cyprus  issue  which  was  quite  difficult  after  the  EU’s  unilateral  act  of 
accepting the GASC as a member of the EU in the absence of a resolution of the 
division of the island.  
The  third  blow  came  on  the  political  side.  First  Angela  Merkel  before 
being elected as the Chancellor of Germany made it clear that she did not support 
Turkey’s membership to the EU and would prefer an alternative relationship, the 
so-called  “privileged  partnership”.  After  she  formed  the  government,  Germany 
announced that it would stay loyal to earlier decisions however the stance of the Kabaalioğlu, H.                                                     DEÜ SBE Dergisi, Cilt:12, Sayı:2 
56 
 
government made a critical difference. After Merkel, Nicholas Sarkozy, elected as 
the president of France in 2007, questioned Turkey’s eligibility for membership on 
grounds  of  culture,  geography and  identity. He said that Turkey is  Asia Minor 
which  is  not Europe. His  messages  were blunt, simple and  easy to understand, 
however they were against the principles of the EU taking into account that Turkey 
was already declared as an eligible country for the then EC in the Commission’s 
Avis  regarding  Turkey’s  application  for  membership  in  1987.  Differently  from 
Germany, France vetoed the opening of certain chapters in the negotiations process 
such  as  economic  and  monetary  union  arguing  that  they  were  linked  with  full 
membership which was not contemplated in Turkey’s case.  
At the moment, the negotiation process is continuing albeit slowly. After 
the opening of the chapter on to negotiations in June 2010, three chapters may be 
possibly  opened  in the near future. However, the remaining chapters cannot be 
opened either because of the Council’s 2006 decision, or one or more Member 
State’s –i.e. France or GASC- blockage. A swift culmination of the negotiations 
leading to full membership depends on strong will and determination on both sides. 
The  problems  are  not  unsolvable  and  progress  may  be  achieved  depending  on 
Turkey’s pace in fulfilling the benchmarks for the opening of chapters. Before this 
however, the vetoes by Member States should be lifted and the Cyprus issue should 
not be used as a pretext to keep Turkey away from Europe. Above all, Turkey 
needs to be given a target date to make the whole negotiation process desirable and 
sensible. The waning support for the EU in Turkey is proof that the EU no longer 
exerts an honest and reliable image in the eyes of average citizens. Constructive 
steps should be taken especially by the EU and EU Member States to integrate 
Turkey into the EU as a member, a country that has so much to contribute to the 
well-being, security and prosperity of the Continent. 
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